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Abstract
We study the impact on payo¤ distribution of varying the proba-
bility (opportunity) that a player has of becoming the proposer in an
ultimatum game (UG). Subjectsassignment to roles within the UG
was randomised before the interactions. Subjects played 20 rounds
anonymously and with random re-matching at each round. We com-
pare the outcomes of four di¤erent settings that di¤ered according to
the distribution of opportunities between the pair of players in each
round, and across the whole 20 rounds. The results clearly point to the
existence of a discontinuity in the origin of the opportunity spectrum.
Allowing a player a 1% probability of becoming the proposer brings
about signicantly lower o¤ers and higher acceptance rates with re-
spect to the benchmark case where a player has no such a chance. As
such probability is raised to 20% and 50%, this same trend continues,
but the e¤ects are generally no longer signicant with respect to the
1% setting. In one case the monotonic pattern is violated. We con-
clude that subjects in our experiment appear to be motivated mostly
by the purely symbolic aspect of opportunity rather than by the actual
fairness in the allocation of opportunities.
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 There is a symbolic utility to us of certainty itself. The
di¤erence between probability .9 and 1.0 is greater than between
.8 and .9, though this di¤erence between di¤erences disappears
when each is embedded in larger otherwise identical probabilistic
gamblesthis disappearance marks the di¤erence as symbolic.
(Nozick 1995, p. 34).
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between distribution
of opportunities and individualspreferences over wealth allocation using an
experimental approach. The notion of equality of opportunity is one of the
cornerstones of systems of distributive justice in contemporary societies. It
can be dened as a condition where the assignment of individuals to places
in the social hierarchy is determined by some form of competitive process,
and all members of society are eligible to compete on equal terms. [...] The
background assumption is that a society contains a hierarchy of more and
less desirable, superior and inferior positions (Anderson, 2002). Various
notions of equality of opportunity have been put forward in the political
philosophy literature1, which have stimulated di¤erent kinds of economic
policies. A¢ rmative action programs seek to bring about greater fulllment
of formal equality of opportunity by imposing coercive imposition of quotas
for social groups that have been discriminated in the past. Governments also
devote large amounts of public expenditures to insure primary education2,
and to ght child poverty3, in large part to improve substantial equality of
opportunity.
In spite of the centrality of this notion for contemporary political systems,
our knowledge of how individuals preferences and values react to greater
equality of opportunities is extremely scarce. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
1For instance, Williams (1962) distinguishes between formal and substantial equality
of opportunity. Both approaches share the idea that the government should reduce the
di¤erences in individuals unchosen circumstances that a¤ect the access to positions in
the social hierarchy - such as those related to ones initial ascriptive social status. They
di¤er as to whether to demand active policies of wealth redistribution to be implemented.
Substantial equality of opportunities have in turn generated notions such as fairequality
of opportunity (Rawls, 1999; 2001), and the level playing eldconception (Dworkin 2000;
Romer, 1998). For other treatments of opportunity, see Diamond (1995), and Sen (1993).
2According to UNESCO data, the governmental expenditure for each student amounts
to 19% of per capita GDP in the average of OECD countries.
3Examples of such policies are George W. Bushs no-child-left-behind program
(see (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/reports/no-child-left-behind.htm)), or the com-
mitment to halve the child poverty by the Labor party in the UK.
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are one exception when they maintain that preferences for policies of redis-
tribution across US citizens depend on individual beliefs on what determines
ones position in the social ladder. In particular, people who believe that
the US society o¤ers equal opportunities of getting ahead in their lifeare
more averse to redistribution4. This nding suggests that individuals may
consider wealth redistribution as a substitute for the lack of real opportuni-
ties, and more generally points to the existence of a link between preference
over earnings allocation and opportunities.
In our study, we use various settings of an Ultimatum Game (UG hence-
forth) to investigate the relationship between distribution of opportunities
and preferences over earning allocation (Guth et al., 1982). In an UG two
individuals participate in a bargaining problem over the division of a pie
from an asymmetric position. The proposer of the game has a rst-mover
advantage over the responder in that she can dictate the shares of the nal
allocations, whereas the responder only has a veto power on such proposal.
This position of advantage is normally conducive to a larger share of the pay-
o¤s accruing to proposers, who on average obtain more than 60% of the pie
(see e.g. Kagel and Roth, 1995). In this sense, the proposers position may
be thought of as being more desirable than that of the responder. This set-
ting seems therefore to o¤er a suitable framework to study how opportunities
are connected with preferences over payo¤s distribution experimentally. The
main novelty of our experiments is to make the access to the two positions
in the bargaining game subject to a lottery, and to manipulate the distri-
bution of probability of these lotteries across di¤erent treatments. We can
thus quantify the degree of opportunityfor a subject as their probability to
become the proposer in the UG, and examine how individual choices respond
to variations in such probability distribution. As the literature has already
extensively emphasized, inequality aversion and, more generally, preferences
over inequality aversion or conformity to social norms of fairness play an
important role in determining individual behavior in the UG (e.g. Camerer
2003). In this paper we examine how such preferences are mediated by
changes in the initial allocation of opportunities.
More specically, in our baseline treatment (0-Opp.) only one player in
the group of two is allowed to make a proposal to the other player. That
is, a player has no opportunity of having her proposal being selected, which
4This result is robust to controlling for the individual prospects of income class mo-
bility - both in terms of individual perception and an objective estimation elaborated by
the authors. The measure used by the authors to assess individual perceptions of equality
of opportunities is their answer to the following question from the General Social Sur-
vey Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that
lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most
important?
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represents the setting with the most extreme assignment of opportunities.
In all the other three treatments we consider, both players in a group have
some positive probabilities of becoming the proposer of the group. These
probabilities are known ex ante by both players, when they are required to
make a proposal. We name the three treatments that modify the baseline
case according to the probability of becoming the proposer assigned to the
less favored subject in the group. These probabilities are 50%, 20%, and 1%,
which then correspond to settings with the presence of equal opportunities
(Eq. Opp.), moderate inequality of opportunities (20%-Opp.), and sym-
bolic opportunity(1%-Opp.). The last setting should in principle be only
marginally di¤erent to the 0-Opp case in terms, the fundamental di¤erence
being that the less favored individual is in fact allowed to make a proposal,
although the chances of this proposal being selected are extremely small. We
repeat the game for 20 rounds, with random re-matching at the beginning
of each round. We also vary the intertemporal allocation of opportunities
across the 20 rounds. In our rst study an individual always carries the same
probability in each round of becoming the proposer in the group (we call
this study xed role condition (FRC)). In the second study, the probabilities
are reassigned before each round (we refer to this as variable role condition
(VRC)). Therefore, in the FRC the intertemporal allocation of opportunities
is extremely biased, whereas in the VRC it is perfectly unbiased. This enables
us to investigate how variations in intertemporal allocation of opportunities
inuence individual behavior.
We want to test for the following two hypotheses: (i) Opportunity has
a symbolic value (or utility) to the subjects. In particular, the setting with
a merely symbolic opportunity (1%-Opp) may be considered as creating a
playing eldmore levelthan the setting with no opportunity. This may
induce responders to be more lenient in accepting proposals, ceteris paribus,
and thus allow proposers to demand more for themselves. If (i) focuses on the
originof the opportunity spectrum, (ii) generalizes this conjecture to the
whole of the spectrum. In (ii) we claim that as the fairness in the allocation
of opportunities increases, so do proposersdemands, and, ceteris paribus,
responders probability of acceptance. We test for this hypothesis rstly
comparing patterns of behavior across the 1%-Opp, 20%-Opp, and Eq-Opp,
where opportunities within each round become progressively more equally
distributed. Secondly, we also test for this hypothesis comparing the FRC
and the VRC, where the intertemporal allocation of opportunities is biased
in the former case and unbiased in the latter. We do this because subjects
behavior may be a¤ected not just by the possible unfairness in the single
round of interaction, but also by the perceived unfairness of the whole 20
rounds of interactions. (i) has not been addressed in the empirical literature
before. One theoretical antecendent is Nozicks (1991) theory of symbolic
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utility, such that some actions could have an intrinsic value for individuals to
the extent that they symbolize a principle5. On the basis of this idea, it may
be argued that the possibility for an individual to put forward a proposal in
the 1%-Opp. setting may have an intrinsic value for her that goes beyond
the negligibility of her chances to have that proposal actually selected. (ii)
is consistent with Alesina and La Ferraras (2005) result. The test of this
hypothesis within an experimental setting enables us to check explicitly how
individual preferences over wealth distribution reacts to manipulations in the
inequality of opportunity.
Our main results are: i) The settings assigning 1% probability and 0
probability to the non-favored person are indeed signicantly di¤erent from
each other. Favored proposers in the 1%-Opp setting demand signicantly
more for themselves compared to favored proposers in the 0-Opp setting.
Likewise, responders reject o¤ers with a signicantly higher probability, all
things being equal, in the 0-Opp compared to the 1%-Opp. Furthermore,
hypothesis i) holds in both VRC and FRC, thus showing its resilience to
variations of the context. ii) Increasing such probability to 20% and 50%
brings about behavior generally consistent with a monotonically increasing
pattern, but no signicant di¤erence with respect to the 1% setting emerges.
In one case in the VRC the monotonictrend halts at the 20% opportunity
level and is reversed moving to the 50% level. Moreover, comparing the
results of the FRC treatment with the VRC treatment, we observe that the
introduction of intertemporal equality of opportunity to become a proposer
in the VRC brings about a signicant increase in both favored proposers
demands, and non-favored respondersprobability of acceptance if compared
to the FRC treatment. In section 4.4 we conjecture that the reversal in the
monotonicity pattern observed in the VRCmay be due to subjects attributing
a role of focal pointto the outcome of the lottery, which is possible in a
context of intertemporal equality of opportunity, but not in a context of
intertemporal inequality of opportunity. Overall, these results suggest that
the symbolic aspect of opportunity seems to account for most of the variation
in individual behavior across changes in settings.
The analysis on how the presence of opportunity a¤ect individualsal-
location preferences has received little attention in the empirical economic
literature. The only experimental study we are aware of that addresses a re-
lated issue is Bolton et Al. (2005, BBO henceforth)6, who investigate within
UGs whether the allocation bias of a random fair procedure inuences the ex
5Along symilar line see Anderson and Pildes (2000): 1503- 75; and Cass Sunstein
(1996): 2021-53.
6Harrison and Mccabe (1996) also employ a similar setting to ours with random role
assignment. However, they only use an unbiased randomization (that is our 50 percent
setting), and their purpose of using it is completely di¤erent from ours.
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post acceptability of the outcome of the procedure. Their main result is that
responders seem to treat equivalently settings with fair procedures leading
to unequal outcomes, and settings with equal outcomes. That is, procedural
fairness - even when leading to unequal outcomes - is under some conditions
a substitutefor outcome equality. However, while BBO study fairness in
direct relation to the nal outcome of the interaction, we analyze fairness
over the allocation of initial opportunities- that is, prior to the unfolding
of the interaction. Furthermore, in our setting we were able to dene an
exact and measurable concept of opportunity, which, as we saw above, can
also be parametrized and changed in order to analyze its impact on the -
nal outcomes in terms of wealth allocation. Ho¤mann et al. (2000) study
how framing an UG as a personalexchange rather than an impersonalone
triggers more equality-oriented behavior in the players. Their manipulation
derives from a change in instructions rather than a change in the structure
of the interaction, as in our case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We illustrate the experi-
mental protocol and the main hypothesis in the next section. In section 3
we show the results under the FRC, in section 4, we show the result from
the VRC and compare this results with the ones obtained with the FRC. In
section 5 we check the robustness of the above result, section 6 is devoted to
the discussion of a post hoc theory able to explain our ndings. Section 7
concludes the paper. The experimental protocol is at the end of the paper.
2 The experimental framework
2.1 The stage game
The game tree of the stage game is displayed in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
10 GBP are at stake in every round. In settings with positive probabilities
assigned to both players - i.e. 1%-Opp, 20%-Opp, and Eq-Opp - both players
simultaneously make a proposal, which is a division of the total pie, to their
counterpart. Formally, a proposal is a division (xi; 10   xi) where xi is the
amount player i; i 2 f1; 2g wants to keep for herself and 10   xi is o¤ered
to her counterpart. For brevity of notation, we will identify an o¤er by
the amount xi and simply call it a proposal. One of these two proposals
are selected at random with probability q and 1   q respectively. At the
time of making a proposal, subjects know the probability with which this
will be randomly selected. The rest of the interaction is exactly like in the
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standard UG. Once a proposal has been selected, it is communicated to the
counterpart of the person who has made that proposal. The proposer is
informed at this stage that her o¤er has been selected, but she does not
receive any information about the o¤er which was not selected. As usual the
responder of the selected o¤er makes a decision as to whether to accept or to
reject the division. If she accepts, then the proposed division is implemented
otherwise both receive 0. In the baseline setting - i.e. the 0-Opp setting
- only one player in the group is allowed to make a proposal to the other
player. Therefore, only the left-hand side of the tree in Figure 1 is relevant
for this case.
We ran four di¤erent treatments of this stage game, which di¤er according
to the values assigned to the probability q. As mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, the case called Eq-Opp7 is the one where both subjects proposals
have equal probabilities of being selected, that is q = 0:5. The other three
treatments assign unequal opportunitiesto the two players of having their
proposals selected. We call the subject who had a larger (smaller) oppor-
tunity the favored (non-favored) player. In the 20%-Opp setting, the
lottery assigns q = 0:2 to the non-favoredplayer, and 1   q = 80% to the
favoredplayer. In the 1%-Oppsetting, the non-favored player has instead
a q = 0:01 opportunity for her proposal to be selected (and the other player
obviously has a 1   q = 0:99 probability). This captures the limiting situa-
tion to the 0-Opp, where the non-favored player has a probability q = 0 of
becoming the proposer in the group. The use of several opportunity levels
aims at studying the variation in individual behaviour upon changes in the
opportunity allocation. Note that from the rational agent theory perspective
all these games are strategy equivalent, and should lead to the proposer ob-
taining the highest possible allocation consistent with making the responder
willing to accept and the responder obtaining the residual. That is, the only
subgame perfect equilibrium is (10 "; ")8, and the level of q should not a¤ect
this result. The 0-Opp, 1%-Opp, 20%-Opp settings were replicated in the
FRC and the VRC, so that overall we had a total of seven treatments.
Subjects played the game described above anonymously for 20 rounds
with random re-matching at the beginning of each round. Therefore, al-
though the probability that the same pair would interact in more than one
period was in general substantial, the random re-matching and the anonymity
of the play minimized the incentives to create reputation e¤ects. In order
to reduce even further these incentives, payo¤s were assigned on the basis of
the outcomes of just two rounds out of the 20;which were randomly selected
7All the terms are only for the exposure of this paper and have obviously never been
revealed to the subjects.
8Since players were allowed to make o¤ers over the [0; 10] interval up to the second
decimal digit, " = 0:01 in our experiments.
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at the end of the session. This payment rule entailed that there was only
a 10% chance that a particular future round would actually determine the
players nal payo¤. In this way, a player had to multiply the probability to
encounter in a future round the player with whom she was currently matched
by 10%; if she wanted to determine the actual inuence of her action in the
current round over the nal payo¤ she would receive. Therefore, given a
certain probability z of being re-matched with the same player in the future,
the probability that the current action would have some inuence over the
nal payo¤ was in fact z=10.
At the beginning of a session, all the procedures were explained to the
subjects and it was emphasized that every round was independent from the
others. After each round of interaction, each pair was informed of the out-
come of their interaction. No information about the outcome of the other
pairsinteractions was instead released. It is clear that the feedback at the
end of each round introduced the possibility that playerschoices were sub-
ject to path-dependence and history contagion e¤ects. However, we preferred
this dynamic setting to a uni-periodal one to examine whether learning (over
the rules of the games) or experience (over other playersstrategies) e¤ects
may a¤ect playersstrategies in comparison to the rst period. We also be-
lieve that the procedures adopted to minimize the incentives for reputation
e¤ects make playerschoices independent from each other to the maximum
possible degree. In the next sections we shall therefore present the results of
our econometric analysis for the whole 20 rounds (sections 3 and 4) as well
as for the rst round (section 5).
What do the benchmark social utility models predict about the hypothe-
ses specied in section 1? All of these models are silent as to the importance
of a procedure as such. Distribution based social utility model will suggest
that the acceptance or rejection of a proposal depends on the inequality
of the proposed division. But then this decision should be independent of
how that division was arrived at. That is, irrespective of the value of q,
responders should reject and accept similarly across procedures. Therefore,
contrary to our hypothesis, we should observe no change in x as we increase
q. Note that risk preferences and out of equilibrium beliefs do not play any
role here because even with social preferences, all of our settings are strategy
equivalent9.
In both the FRC and the VRC, we test for the two main hypotheses of
our paper. Our rst hypothesis is that the very fact of being endowed with
even symbolic opportunities should inuence the outcomes. If it does, that
would mean responders will accept a higher level of inequality, which would
9Note that due to strategic equivalence, menu dependence (Bolton et al, 2005) is not
an issue here.
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lead to a higher average proposal. Formally, we want to check whether the
average x is signicantly di¤erent between the 0-Opp and the other settings,
the 1%-Opp in particular. Notice the following features of our settings which
enable us to test for this hypothesis. First, from any theoretical perspective,
0%-Opp is nothing but the limit of other settings. However, structurally, it
is di¤erent from the others, because here the non-favored person never gets
an opportunity to put forward her proposal. On the contrary, in all other
settings she does get such an opportunity, however small the probability of
selection might be. We will discuss in section 6 why this symmetry in the
actions of the two players can a¤ect the nal outcome.
Our second hypothesis says that higher opportunities to the non-favored
player will lead to higher inequality in outcome. That is, as the procedure
become relatively more unbiased and hence more procedurally fair, the re-
sponder will accept more unequal divisions. This will also be reected in the
proposals, because anticipating this behavior in response, subjects, on aver-
age, will increase their proposal. In other words, the fairer the procedure, the
higher the inequality in outcomes. Formally, an increase in the value of q will
increase xi. We can test for this hypothesis both within a static setting and
dynamically. The latter is made possible by comparing allocations emerging
in the VRC - where each player has a 50% of becoming the favored player
in each round of the biased opportunity settings - with those resulting in
the FRC - where instead this probability is 0 for the group of non-favored
players.
2.2 General features of the experimental protocol
Procedures for all the games in both FRC and VRC were the same except
for the probability of selection q. The experiment instructions for one setting
appear at the end of the paper. Experiments have been conducted on a pop-
ulation of 426 Warwick University undergraduate students, with an average
of 60 students per treatment. Only subjects who had not been attending
courses in Game Theory were allowed to participate. We run three sessions
per treatment. Due to varying show-up rates, the number of subjects per
session was not constant across sessions but varied from a minimum of 16
to a maximum of 24 subjects, with an average of around 20 subjects per
session10. The analysis we present in the next sections is however robust to
controlling for the number of subjects participating in each session. Each
subject only participated in one session. We took care in balancing the com-
position of the sessions in terms of gender and number of people enrolled in
Economics and Psychology courses with respect to the total. Each session
10More precisely, the number of subjects per session was as follows:
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was organised according to the following procedures. Subjects were paid a
show-up fee of GBP5 upon their entering the experimental room, and were
assigned to a computer following the random draw of a card. Instructions
were then administered, a written comprehension check was carried out, and
then subjects were involved in the 20 interactions of our protocol. All sub-
jects answered the comprehension quizzes exactly. At the end of the decisions
subjects completed a short questionnaire asking demographic questions, and
then received their payo¤s. The whole session lasted around an hour. The
average earnings - in addition to the show-up fee - was GBP8.22 . The game
was conducted using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 1999).
3 Results for the Fixed Role Condition
In the FRC, at the beginning of each session subjects were randomly divided
into two groups, favored and non-favored, except for the Eq-Opp where obvi-
ously no subject may be considered as favoredbecause both players in the
group had the same probability of becoming proposers in the interaction11.
The main results are as follows.
 In settings where positive probabilities are attributed to the non-favored
persons proposal (that is 1%-Opp, 20%-Opp and Eq-Opp) , favored
proposers demanded signicantly more for themselves compared to the
0%-Opp setting. In particular proposals under the 1%-Opp setting is
signicantly higher than that under the 0%-Opp setting. Similarly, av-
erage rejected proposals is higher under the 0%-Opp setting compared
to all others. Therefore, all things being equal, the probability of ac-
ceptance of a proposal is higher in those setting than in the 0%-Opp
setting.
 As q increases from 1% to higher levels (that is to 20% and 50%),
so do the favored playersdemands and the probability of acceptance.
However, these changes are never signicant for proposals, and are
only signicant in one case for acceptance rates (everything else being
equal), in the Eq-Opp setting compared to the 1%-Opp.8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Number of subjects per session
16
18
20
22
24
Number of sessions
2
2
9
7
1
11To simplify terminology we call both roles as favoured in Eq-Opp setting.
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3.1 Proposers Behavior in the FRC
We begin with the analysis of proposersbehavior. For sake of comparability,
in the analysis that follows we only consider the proposals made by those
subjects who were favored in the random procedure. That is, in the 1%-Opp
and the 20%-Opp we discard all those observations made by subjects who
had a 1% and a 20% chance of their proposals being selected for approval
by the responder, respectively. The reason is that, particularly in the 1%
setting, players had extremely little incentives to do strategically reasonable
o¤ers, given the small probability they had of being selected as proposers.
The results of the analysis would nevertheless be unchanged qualitatively
should these observations be included. Descriptive statistics for proposal
under each setting are presented in Table 1; from where we can observe
monotonic increase in the average proposal.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Proposals - FRC - All rounds
Proposal 0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
Mean 6:28 6:77 6:89 6:96
St. dev. 0:91 0:88 0:82 1:05
Min 0:5 4 4:5 2:5
Max 10 9:9 9 9:75
N 620 640 620 1240
Figure 2 plots the evolution over rounds of mean proposals from favored
proposers under the FRC. The di¤erences in proposal between 0%-Opp and
the rest can be clearly seen from this graph. The existence of a trend for
some of the settings may also be detected.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
To make pairwise comparisons between settings, we employ a regression
pooling all proposals from favored players, using dummy variables to identify
observations coming from di¤erent settings. In particular, we pool observa-
tions coming from both FRC and VRC12. We consider the following random
e¤ects model:
12The results of the analysis would not change running separate regressions for the FRC
and VRC. Pooling the observations from the two conditions also enables us to run tests
over di¤erences between them within the same model, which will be presented in section
4.4. More generally, the results we present are also robust to introducing session dummies,
which is an even stronger of control than introducing dummies for the number of subjects
per session (see section 2.2).
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PROPOSALi;t = + tROUNDt + jSETTINGj + "i + ui;t (1)
The index j denotes the observations coming from a certain setting j out
of the four settings that we have investigated in the FRC. The sub-indexes
i and t denote the individual and the round of the interaction, respectively.
Hence, t = 1 : : : 20. The model includes dummy variables, ROUNDt; for each
of the 20 rounds the games were played. SETTINGj is a dummy variable
that identies observations coming from setting j. The parameters j there-
fore signal whether signicant di¤erences exist in proposals under setting j
in comparison with the baseline setting. Finally, "i is an individual-specic
error term, whereas ui;t is the error term referring to each observation. Stan-
dard errors are robust to heteroschedacity and clustered across individuals
(Froot, 1989). Clustering makes it possible to treat errors as both indepen-
dent across decisions from di¤erent individuals, and arbitrarily correlated
for decisions made by the same individual. In this section we only focus
on di¤erences between settings, whereas we comment over results regarding
the existence of trends in section 5. The overall results of the regression are
reported in Table 14, column 1, in 8.
The following table reports in each cell the results concerning various
tests conducted on the di¤erences between pairs of parameters j and k:
We report the z-statistics and the level of rejection for the null hypothesis
of equality of the coe¢ cients: So, the content of a cell (j; k) refers to the
result of the test with null hypothesis Ho: j   k = 0. Note that a positive
(negative) sign for the z-statistics means that the proposals were on average
higher (lower) in setting j (row entry) in relation to setting k (column entry).
For instance, the cell corresponding to the row 1%-Opp and column 0%-Opp
setting reports the z-statistics for the dummy variable identifying the 1%-
Opp setting in the pooled regression over observations from the 1%-Opp and
the 0%-Opp settings. The value of 2:86 for such z-statistics implies that this
variable is strongly signicant at less than the 1% level, and that proposals
were on average signicantly higher in the 1%-Opp setting in comparison with
the 0%-Opp setting. In the following tables and in all the tables afterwards,
acceptance at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level are denoted by one, two
and three stars respectively.
Table 2: Di¤erence in Proposals - FRC - All Rounds
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 2:86***
20%-Opp 3:52*** 0:72
Eq-Opp 4:30*** 1:24 0:44
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One can see that while comparing 0%-Opp with each of the other three
settings, the coe¢ cients of the dummy variables identifying each setting is
signicant at the 1% level in all three cases. However, the coe¢ cients for the
dummy variables although they have the expected signare statistically
indistinguishable (at 10% condence level) from each other in the remaining
three pairs, which attribute positive opportunities to the non-favored role.
3.2 Responders Behavior in the FRC
Descriptive statistics are reported below for rejected o¤ers - namely, the share
o¤ered to a responder conditional on the proposal having been rejected - and
the overall frequency of acceptance under the various settings. Analogously
to the analysis of proposersbehavior, we only focus on responses of non-
favored players. In this case, the behavior of favored players who lost the
lottery to select proposal may be a¤ected by the fact that their payo¤ ex-
pectancy was higher than that of non-favored players. We thus prefer to
eschew these observations from the analysis. The results would not change
substantially considering both favored and non-favored players responses.
In Table 3, we note that increases in opportunity are associated with quite
substantial drops in the mean rejected o¤er.13
Table 3: Unfavoured responders behaviour in FRC - All Rounds
Rejected o¤er 0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
Mean 2:96 2:53 2:52 2:15
Min 0 0:1 1 0:25
Max 4:5 4 4:2 4
Average Acceptance 0:776 0:788 0:844 0:815
Total O¤ers 620 636 473 620
This pattern is also evident in Figure 3; showing rejection and acceptance
rate of proposals which o¤er less than 20% of the pie to responders. The
existence of a monotonic pattern, both in the number of unfairo¤ers and
in the probability of acceptance, is quite evident.
INSERT HERE FIGURE 3
13Note that the number of o¤ers to non-favoured players may di¤er from those made by
favoured players in the 1%-Opp and in the 20%-Opp settings because of the outcomes of
the randomization procedure.
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The above descriptive statistics obviously do not control for the size of
the o¤er, which we have noted is quite variable across settings. Economet-
ric analysis enables us to study the probability of acceptance holding this
variable constant. We thus use the dichotomic variable acceptance (ACC)
- where 1 (0) denotes acceptance (rejection) of a given proposal - as the
dependent variable within a logistic model:
ACCi;t = + tROUNDt + jSETTINGj + OFFER + "i + ui;t (2)
The econometric specication is analogous to that deployed to analyze pro-
posals, with the key addition of the variable OFFER controlling for the
amount o¤ered to the responder. Even in this case SETTING is the dummy
variable identifying the settings of the experiments, and ROUND dummies
are included. Finally, like in equation 1, "i and ui;t are individual-specic and
observation-specic error terms. The complete regression results are reported
in Table 15, column 1, in section 8.
A comparison between Table 4, which captures the signicance of SETTING
on pairwise comparisons of acceptance, and Table 2 - which is the correspond-
ing table for proposals - shows that the former somehow mirrors the latter
in terms of signicant e¤ects of the setting dummies. Generally speaking,
a signicantly higher value for PROPOSAL in a setting j vis-à-vis setting
k is matched with a higher probability of acceptance in the former vis-à-vis
the latter. One can see that settings assigning non-favored players a positive
chance of having their proposals being selected are associated with a higher
probability of acceptance of a proposal, all things being equal, in comparison
with the 0%-Opp settings. However, some relevant di¤erences emerge - un-
like the case of proposal, we nd that acceptance level is signicantly higher
in Eq-Opp than in the 1%-Opp, while the di¤erence between 1%-Opp and
20%-Opp has the expected sign according to hypothesis (ii), but it is not
signicant at the 10% level.
Table 4: Di¤erence in Acceptance Rates - FRC-All Rounds
Acceptance 0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 2:61***
20%-Opp 3:83*** 1:34
Eq-Opp 5:16*** 2:65*** 1:18
To summarize our main ndings, there is clear evidence that fairer as-
signments of opportunities can sustain or even lead to a higher inequality in
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outcomes. However, most of this changes seem to be absorbed by disconti-
nuity in behavior associated with the assignments of minimal opportunities
to the non-favored player in comparison to the no opportunity case, rather
than by substantially fairer allocations of opportunities.
4 The Variable Role Condition
4.1 General Features
The interactions under the VRC are identical to those under the FRC, the
only di¤erence lying in the formation of random pairings. In contrast to
the FRC, here the status of a subject (favored or non-favored) is decided
randomly (with equal probability) at the beginning of every round. Thus at
each round all the subjects have an ex ante equal chance of getting a favored
(or non-favored) role.14 Only when the random pairings have been made,
subjects are informed of their respective roles. Once again, a non-favored
subject in 0%-Opp VRC is not asked to make an o¤er. However, unlike the
FRC case this is not a restriction for the entire session, because in following
rounds the same person can be randomly selected to play a favored role.
To make proper comparisons, we replicate all FRC settings in variable role
except for Eq-Opp, which would be the same anyway under both conditions.
The main purpose of this condition is to control for the impact of inter-
termporal allocation of opportunities. Furthermore, this study also repre-
sents a robustness check for the result obtained under the FRC since we
introduce the possibility of role reversals, which might have inuenced our
results in the FRC. It is well possible that experiencing the perspectives of
all possible roles, involved in a game, enhance subjects understanding of its
strategic aspects. Recall that except for 0%-Opp, in all other FRC settings
both subjects got a chance of making an o¤er. Moreover, in FRC, to begin
with, subjects were divided into favored and non-favored groups. So once a
subject was in a non-favored (or favored) group, she remained in that group
for the entire session. Therefore a subject, who was in the non-favored group
in 0%-Opp setting never got a chance to make an o¤er, unlike the rest. Did
the absence of such possibility restricted their understanding of strategic in-
teractions? Could this have inuenced our result rather than the intrinsic
fairness aspect of participation?15
The main observations are in line with those from the FRC. Following is
14So for instance, in 0%-Opp setting, in each pair, one of the players is selected at
random with probability 12 and asked to make an o¤er. Similarly, say in 20%-Opp, one of
the partners is selected with probability 12 to play the favored role.
15Bolton (1991) showed that there is no e¤ect of role reversal on UG.
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a summary of our ndings. Therefore comparisons here will involve, Eq-Opp
and the variable role versions of the other three settings (0%-Opp, 1%-Opp
and 20%-Opp).
 As in FRC, proposals under the 0%-Opp is signicantly lower than the
other three settings, which o¤er positive probability of selection to the
non-favored person. Di¤erences in acceptance rates are also signicant.
However the evidence here is not always as strong as that in the FRC.
For a couple of comparisons, our hypothesis is accepted only at the
10% level (as opposed to the 1% level in FRC) of signicance.
 The e¤ect of increasing opportunity beyond the 0%-Opp setting is not
monotonic. In fact there are evidence that, other things being equal,
probability of acceptance of a proposal is lower in Eq-Opp compared
to 20%-Opp and 1%-Opp setting. This stands against the thesis that
increases in procedural fairness seen here as increases in equality of
opportunity - should lead to higher acceptance rates (see BBO, 2005).
4.2 Proposers Behavior in the VRC
Descriptive statistics for proposals under each setting of the VRC are re-
ported in Table 5. The data related to the Eq-Opp obviously coincide with
those summarized in Table 3, and have been reported for the readers conve-
nience.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Proposals -VRC-All Rounds
Proposal 0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
Mean 6:56 7:20 7:37 6:96
St. dev. 1:07 0:90 0:98 1:05
Min 0 5 5 2:5
Max 10 10 10 9:75
N 600 560 600 620
Figure 4 plots the evolution over rounds of mean proposals from favored
proposers under the VRC. Clearly there is an upward trend in average pro-
posals, in particular in the 0%-Opp setting.
INSERT FUGURE 4 HERE
Our hypothesis of intrinsic importance of symbolic opportunity still holds
strongly under the VRC. The same econometric analysis as that developed
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for the FRC (see Table 14, column 1) shows that proposals in the 0%-Opp
are signicantly lower than all of the other three settings (at the 1% level).
Thus, proposed divisions are clearly more unequal under any setting o¤er-
ing positive probability of selection to the non-favored persons proposal.
This is shown in Table 6, which reports in each cell the z-statistics and the
signicance levels for di¤erences in the  parameters for proposals. More-
over, the only comparison where some signicant di¤erence emerges among
the settings assigning positive opportunities to the non-favored player is be-
tween the 20%-Opp and the Eq-Opp settings. However, the sign in this case
is opposite to what one may have expected. Favored proposers under the
20%-Opp demand signicantly more than in the Eq-Opp setting. This result
reverses the monotonicity path that would link increases in opportunity for
non-favored individuals to higher shares for favored proposers. In fact, even
the proposals in the 1%-Opp setting are higher than in the Eq-Opp setting,
although the coe¢ cients are not signicantly di¤erent.
Table 6: Di¤erences in Proposals - VRC-All Rounds
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 4:36***
20%-Opp 5:57*** 1:27
Eq-Opp 2:90***  1:54  2:82***
4.3 Responders Behavior in the VRC
Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics for responders behavior in the VRC.
Even in this case, the drop in the mean rejected o¤er as opportunity increases
is quite noticeable. However, this monotonic path is reversed in correspon-
dence of the Eq-Opp rule, which has a higher mean value for rejected o¤ers
than both the 1%-Opp and the 20%-Opp settings. In fact, the conictuality
rate is the highest in the Eq-Opp setting in comparison to all of the oth-
ers, and this is in fact lowest in the 0%-Opp setting, followed closely by the
20%-Opp setting.
Table 7: Non-favoured responders behaviour in VRC
Rejected o¤er 0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
Mean 2.43 2.06 1.68 2.15
St. dev. 0.91 0.78 0.72 0.849
Min 0 0 0 0.25
Max 4 3.6 3.5 4
Average Acceptance 0.850 0.816 0.848 0.815
Total O¤ers 600 553 475 620
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We obviously need to control for the size of the o¤er to make sense of these
results. We thus study di¤erences in settings using the same econometric
model given in section 2. Even in this case, the results for proposers are
mirrored by those for responders. We nd that acceptance rates are higher
under all settings assigning positive opportunities to the non-favored player
compared to the 0%-Opp. However, the e¤ect of the SETTING dummy
variables in pairwise comparisons is sometimes only weakly signicant, for
instance at the 5% level while comparing with 1%-Opp and at 10% level
while comparing with the 20%-Opp.
Table 8: Di¤erences in Acceptance Rates -VRC-All Rounds
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 2:07**
20%-Opp 3:96*** 2:08**
Eq-Opp 1:78*  0:36  2:46**
VRC settings show that the conrmation of our second hypothesis, which
predicts higher acceptance rates in outcomes with an increase in opportunity,
does not always carry over from FRC to VRC. Likewise, the Eq-Opp setting
leads to lower acceptance rates than either the 1%-Opp and the 20%-Opp,
the di¤erence being signicant in the latter comparison at the 5% level. Note
that this goes against our ndings in FRC. There we found some evidence
in favour of monotonicity - in particular we noticed that the acceptability
of biased outcome increases with an increase in opportunity. It is plausible
that in the VRC, the e¤ect of inequality in opportunity has been o¤set by
the presence of inter-temporal fairness.
We believe this is due to the combination of the features of equality of
inter-temporal opportunities in the VRC and the asymmetric character of
the random procedure. In spite of the random matching procedures and the
random payo¤ determination making decisions independent from each other,
our conjecture is that subjects exploited the asymmetry of the random selec-
tion procedure of proposal as a focal point supporting a normattributing
a larger share of the pie to a favoured subject. Given the inter-temporally
fair character of this procedure, responders were happy to accept a relatively
more unequal distribution (in comparison to other settings) on the basis that
they would have beneted from the same norm in the future when put in the
proposersrole. This conjecture is conrmed by the fact that there exists a
statistically signicant di¤erence - although weakly - in proposals between
favoured and non-favoured players in the 20%-OppVRC setting16, with
16A Mann-Whitney test conducted on the equality of proposal distribution between the
favored and non-favored groups yields a z = 1.884, with p-value = 0.0596.
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non-favored players demanding less than favored players. Further analysis is
nevertheless needed in support of this conjecture.
To summarize, it is abundantly clear that opportunity, per se, plays a very
crucial role in determining the perception of fairness. However, inequality of
opportunity seems to have little e¤ect on this, particularly in the presence of
inter-temporally unbiased procedures. Moreover fair procedures, in the sense
described above, are relatively more outcome unequal than unfair procedures.
4.4 Comparing xed and variable roles conditions
Finally, we compare each of our settings across FRC and VRC. As we already
argued there are two layers of opportunity involved in the VRC. First, as in
the FRC, each stage game o¤ers an opportunity for a particular period - this
we will call as static opportunity. So for instance the 20%-Opp setting o¤ers
unequal static opportunity level to the subjects. However, in VRC, roles are
selected at random at the beginning of every period - so all subjects have
equal ex ante probability of being selected as a proposer. To distinguish
it from the ex-post probability of selection, we call this as inter-temporal
opportunity. Notice that all VRC settings o¤er equal inter-temporal op-
portunity to subjects, while FRC settings are entirely unequal in terms of
inter-temporal opportunity.
The following tables, Table 9 and Table 10, report in each cell the z-
statistics and the signicance level for di¤erences in the  parameters esti-
mated in regressions drawn from 1 and 2. For instance, in Table 9, the cell
corresponding to the row Variable 0%-Opp and column Fixed 0%-Opp setting
reports the z-statistics for the di¤erence in the dummy variable coe¢ cients
identifying the 0%-Opp under VRC and FRC. The value of 3:45 for such
z-statistics implies that this the di¤erence is strongly signicant, and that
(everything else being equal) acceptances were on average signicantly higher
in the VRC 0%-Opp setting in comparison with the FRC 0%-Opp setting.
We nd that proposals are generally lower under the FRC vis-a-vis the
VRC. In particular, this is the case at the 10% signicance level when com-
paring the 0%-Opp settings and at 1% level when contrasting both the 1%-
Opp and the 20%-Opp settings. A possible explanation is that since the
FRC entails an unfair assignment of inter-temporal opportunities, favored
subjects expect non-favored subjects to be less lenient in accepting low o¤ers
under the FRC compared to VRC, and thus reduce their demands signi-
cantly. Probability of acceptance are also signicantly lower in the FRC in
comparison to the corresponding setting in the VRC at the 1% signicance
level. In fact, this is true for all of our settings individually. It is clear that
subjects attached importance not just to the static aspect of the inequality
of opportunity, but also to the inter-temporal one. This may be explained
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both in terms of an attempt to ensure themselves a higher payo¤ but also as
a spiteful reaction to the lack of inter-temporal fairness of this condition17.
Table 9: Di¤erences in Proposals across VRC and FRC
Proposal Fixed 0%-Opp Fixed 1%-Opp Fixed 20%-Opp
Variable 0%-Opp 1:67*
Variable 1%-Opp 2:63***
Variable 20%-Opp 2:96***
Table 10: Di¤erences in Acceptances across VRC and FRC
Acceptance Fixed 0%-Opp Fixed 1%-Opp Fixed 20%-Opp
Variable 0%-Opp 3:45***
Variable 1%-Opp 2:91***
Variable 20%-Opp 3:30***
5 Other Results
5.1 Results for First Round
The random e¤ects model used above is a widespread method to analyze
repeated interactions in experimental economics, at least as a general way
of examining the existence of some kind of relationships across variables.
However, it is plausible that subjects to some extent adapted their strategies
to the feedback received at the end of each interaction. In particular, it is
presumable that proposers updated their beliefs over respondersminimum
acceptable o¤er on the basis of their past experience, and modied their
demands accordingly. If this is true, the assumption of a constant auto-
correlation parameter across time for each individual is infringed.
In the present section, we check for the robustness of our previous analy-
sis with respect to these problems by analyzing subjectsbehaviour in the
17It also has to be taken into account that the division of player into two groups in the
FRC implied that the probability of being re-matched with the same players in future
interactions was higher. For instance, in a session with 20 players, a subject had a pool
of 19 subjects with whom to be matched in the VRC, and of 10 players in the FRC.
Moreover, it is also relevant from a strategic point of view that the probability of being
matched in the same role in the future was clearly higher in the FRC than in the VRC.
All this should lead to a higher incentive in creating reputational e¤ects under the FRC
than the VRC. However, the payment rule that has been chosen should have the e¤ect of
rescaling these probabilities to 10% of their actual value (see section 2). This means that
the relevant probability of being re-matched with the same player in the future would be
smaller than 7% in the VRC and 10% in the FRC, with the di¤erence between the two
being at most of 3%.
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rst round. Obviously, no history-contagion e¤ect and correlation across in-
dividual histories can occur in the rst round. We have used econometric
specications analogous to 1 and 2 to analyze behavior in the rst round,
(there is no need to control for ROUND in this case).
PROPOSALi;t = + jSETTINGj + "i + ui;t (3)
ACCi;t = + jSETTINGj + OFFER + "i + ui;t (4)
In analogy to the foregoing sections, the tables below report the results
for tests over the hypotheses of equality of some relevant combinations of
parameters18. The overall regression results are reported in Tables 14 and
15, column 2. The main results are as follows:
 Proposals are signicantly higher in all of the positive opportunity set-
tings vis-à-vis the 0%-Opp setting. This is the case at less than the 1%
level of signicance.
 In all but one case - namely, the 1%-Opp vis-à-vis the 20%-Opp -
there exists a positive relationship between increase in the fairness of
opportunity and proposersdemands. However, these di¤erences are
never signicant across the three positive opportunity settings.
 Similarly, in all but one case - namely, the 1%-Opp vis-à-vis the 20%-
Opp - there exists a positive relationship between increases in the fair-
ness of opportunity and probability of acceptance. However, these dif-
ferences are never signicant across the three positive opportunity set-
tings.
18For instance, the comparison between the 20%-Opp and the 1%-Opp settings is carried
out through a test over the null hypothesis: H0 = (20V RC + 20FRC)  (1V RC + 1FRC),
where the coe¢ cients f20V RC ; 20FRC ; 1V RC ; 1FRCg are the coe¢ cients for the dum-
mies identifying the 20%-Opp VRC, 20%-Opp FRC, 1%-Opp VRC and 1%-Opp FRC,
respectively, derived from the regressions reported in Table 14 and 15, column 2. In com-
parisons involving the Eq-Opp setting, we have multiplied the associated coe¢ cient by 2
not to distort the comparison between this coe¢ cient and the sum of other two coe¢ cients.
So, for instance, the comparison between the Eq. Opp setting and the 1%-Opp settings
will have null hypothesis given by: H0 = (2 Eq Opp)   (1V RC + 1FRC) = 0, where
Eq Opp is the coe¢ cient for the dummy variable identifying the Eq. Opp setting.
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Table 10: Di¤erence in Proposals - ROUND 1
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 2.97***
20%-Opp 2.67*** -0.36
Eq-Opp 3.04*** 0.23 0.57
Table 11: Di¤erence in Acceptance- ROUND 1
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 2.08**
20%-Opp 1.73* -0.13
Eq-Opp 2.05** 0.74 0.81
Therefore, these results conrm those illustrated in the previous sections
of a strong symbolicvalue of opportunity on peoples behavior, and of a
weak monotonic pattern in the interior of the opportunity region, which
is reversed in one case. Therefore, the relevance of the symbolic aspect
of opportunity does not appear to be brought about by the evolution of
interactions, but is present from the very rst round 19.
5.2 Results for Round 20 and for the existence of a
trend
In this section we analyze only the last round. This allows focusing only on
the static e¤ect of opportunity, i.e. without a possible bias due to dynamic
considerations. In particular, we have applied the same model to Round 20
as that used to analyze Round 1. The results are reported in Table 12 and
13 below, whereas the whole regression results are reported in Tables 14 and
15, column 3. The strongly signicant di¤erences in proposals between the
0%-Opp setting and all of the other positive opportunity settings is evident.
There are also clear non-monotonicities in the relation between reductions in
the inequality of the opportunity allocation and proposals, which is in one
case signicant - namely, the Eq-Opp bringing less unequal proposals than
the 20%-Opp setting. The latter result is mainly driven by the VRC, on
19It has to be stressed, though, that the patterns illustrated above are not equally
strong in the FRC and VRC. Di¤erences are larger in the latter, whereas those in FRC
are signicant at conventional levels only in one case. The corresponding results are
reported in Tables 16-19 in the Appendix.
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which we have already commented. What is perhaps surprising is that this
time no signicant di¤erence emerges with respect to acceptance rates, all
the tests being largely insignicant (see Table 13). This is in stark contrast
with the patterns of behavior observed in round 1 (Table 12) as well as for all
rounds (Tables 8 and 4), which instead showed signicant di¤erences across
some of the settings.
Table 12: Di¤erences in Proposals - ROUND 20
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 4.37***
20%-Opp 6.35*** 1.41
Eq-Opp 3.01*** -0.97 -2.34**
Table 13: Di¤erences in Proposals - ROUND 20
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp Eq-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 0.54
20%-Opp 0.74 0.16
Eq-Opp 0.24 -0.30 -0.48
In spite of the low incentives to create reputation e¤ects (see section 2),
it is all the same possible that respondersbehavior was partly motivated
by the objective to induce proposers to reduce their claims in future rounds.
This may add a further motivation to the objective of altruistic punishment,
which has already been highlighted in the literature (Henrich et al., 2001),
and which may be at work in both a static as well as in a dynamic setting.
Rather than on altruistic grounds, this motivation may be self-interested in
character in that punishing a subject in the current round may increase the
probability of a higher o¤er in the future, especially in the FRC. In fact,
we already observed that the probability of acceptance is far higher in the
VRC - where the pool of possible proposers averaged 20 subjects - than in
the FRC - where the pool of possible matches was on average a half of that
amount (see Table 10). If this conjecture is true, then we should observe an
increasing trend in probability of acceptance, because the futurevalue of a
punishment in the current period decreases as the number of future rounds
diminishes.
We can test this conjecture by modifying our econometric models to in-
clude a trend and an interaction term. Since we are interested in a comparison
between the FRC and VRC, we rule out observations coming from the Eq.
Opp setting, and we apply the following models to our data:
PROPOSALi;t = + tROUNDt + TREND + FRC + TREND 
FRC + "i + ui;t
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ACCEPTANCEi;t = +tROUNDt+TREND+FRC+TREND
FRC + SHARE + "i + ui;t
TREND is a variable that simply equals the number of the round to
which an observation refers, and thus captures the existence of trends in the
evolution of proposals and acceptance rates over time. FRC is a dummy
variable identifying all settings coming from the FRC, and TREND  FRC
is the interaction term between the two. The overall results of the regres-
sions are reported in Tables 14 and 15, columns 4. In summary, we can
conclude that trends exist for both conditions, but they are more marked
in the VRC. More precisely, a trend is strongly signicant under the VRC
for both proposals ( =0.032; z=6.28, p-value<0.000; N= 3640) and accep-
tance rates ( =0.084; z=2.82, p-value=0.005; N= 3357). It is signicant
for proposals ( +  =0.010; z=2.22, p-value=0.027; N= 3640) and weakly
signicant for acceptance ( +  =0.049; z=1.78, p-value=0.075; N= 3357)
in the FRC. The sign of the coe¢ cient in the acceptance rate regression is
positive, which means that the probability of acceptance increased, ceteris
paribus, over time. Therefore, our conjecture that respondersbehavior soft-
ened upover time because of the shortening time horizon is supported by
this analysis. The fact that the trend was steeper in the VRC may be due to
the fact that responders had a higher incentive to be toughin each round
because of the smaller proposerspool, and they started to be so from the
very beginning. In fact, the coe¢ cient  is negative and signicantly di¤erent
from 0 in the regression over acceptance (see Table 15, column 4). We can
infer that this sort of inter-temporal self-interested punishmentmay be at
work, although ethicalpreferences over the overall fairness of the interaction
may be interfering with this motive, too.
6 Discussion
In this section we will try to move towards an explanation, which will con-
nect the concept of opportunity with allocation inequality. Our results show
the presence of a generally increasing monotonic pattern in the relationship
between fair allocation of opportunities on the one hand, and proposal and
probability of acceptance on the other- although this is violated in some cases
in the VRC. Secondly, and more signicantly, there is a discontinuous jump
between the two settings that o¤ers no opportunity to one of the players and
a positive but symbolic opportunity. In particular, no opportunity settings
lead to signicantly more equal outcome than the other ones. This suggests
that an explanation based on traditional models, be it distributional or recip-
rocal fairness will be unsatisfactory. It is clear that our results demand a new
explanation or at least some generalization of the traditional models.
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Before introducing our explanation, let us briey discuss why traditional
models fail to explain our result. There are two main stream of arguments
which departs from the traditional rational choice theory and o¤er explana-
tions for the anomalies observed in laboratory experiments (see Sobel 2005,
for a survey). The rst group of models assume that individuals maximize
well dened preferences, but permit preferences to depend on the payo¤s of
other players. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) among
others have followed this line and have suggested specic functional form
for interdependent preferences. These utility function, in general, could be
written in the following form
ui(x) = xi + ij(xi   xj)xj
ui(x) is agent is utility given an allocation x where xi and xj denote the
shares of i and j respectively. The function ij is the source of interdepen-
dence - it connects is utility with js share. In this formulation, it is easy to
see that irrespective of the opportunity level, the responders behaviour in a
UG always remains the same. Hence, proposersbehaviour will also remain
una¤ected by the opportunity level as well as the ex-post inequality in allo-
cation. The other stream of argument is based on reciprocity and permits
the preference over outcome to depend on the context in which the outcome
was reached . Although context dependence sounds promising in our setup,
none of the models explain (see Rabin (1993) for instance) the association
between allocation and opportunity. In particular, note that, all these models
are continuousin nature and will be unsuitable to explain the discontinuous
jump, we observe, between no opportunity and positive opportunity settings.
Here, we demonstrate that a simple combination of inequality aversion
model with Nozicks symbolic utility can be consistent with our observation.
It would be proper to mention at this stage that our aim is no broader
than that. We neither claim this to be the only possible explanation nor we
propose symbolic utility to be the basis of a new social utility model. The
analysis we sketch here are rudimentary and left many important questions
unanswered.
6.1 Envy factor dependent on Opportunity
We propose a simple extension of the inequality aversion model introduced
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In a two-person society , Fehr-Schmidt utility
function of an agent can be represented as follows:
ui(x) = xi   imax(xj   xi; 0)  imax(xi   xj; 0)
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where xi and xj are share of agent i and j respectively. i  0 is the envy
factor and 0  i  i is the altruism factor. Our experimental results,
in particular, rejection rate across di¤erent opportunity level suggests that
opportunityenters into the utility function through the envy factor. That
is i is not a constant but depends on p, where p is a measure of opportunity.
We have already argued that in our settings it is simply the probability with
which a proposal from an unfavoured player is selected as a proposal. Thus
p can vary between 0 and 0:5. Moreover, one can expect that the higher
the di¤erence in opportunity levels between the two players, the stronger
the envy factor. That is i(p) is a decreasing function in p. Following Fehr
and Schmidt, we assume that the proposer does not know the exact value of
the envy factor of the responder, but knows that it is distributed according
to some distribution function Fp(). The equivalent of decreasing function
i(p) in this setup is as follows. If p1 > p2 then Fp2 rst order stochastically
dominates Fp1.
To keep our model simple we will assume i = 0 and we will use our
toy model to explain two main observations: i) ceteris paribus, a decrease in
inequality of opportunity (that is, an increase in p) increases the probability
of acceptance of a proposal and ii) a decrease in inequality of opportunity
increases the inequality of the allocation.
Suppose j is the proposer and i is the responder. Since, xi and xj denote
the share of agent i and j respectively, we have xi + xj = 1. First note that
in equilibrium, xj  0:5. Otherwise j can increase her utility because any
xj < 0:5 will be accepted by i. Thus (xj   xi)  0 and agent i accepts a
proposal if and only if [xi   i(xj   xi)]  0. Equivalently, if j makes an
o¤er xi, it is accepted by i if and only if he has i  xi1 2xi . Hence, the
probability with which xi is accepted is Fp

xi
1 2xi

. If p1 > p2 then Fp2
rst order stochastically dominates Fp1, implying Fp1

xi
1 2xi

 Fp2

xi
1 2xi

.
That is probability of acceptance increases with p.
Now, the expected payo¤ of the proposer is
h
(1  xi)Fp

xi
1 2xi
i
. Thus
agent j chooses xi which maximizes
h
(1  xi)Fp

xi
1 2xi
i
. The rst order
condition is as follows,
(1  xi)
(1  2xi)2 =
Fp

xi
1 2xi

fp

xi
1 2xi
 (5)
where fp is the density function. To show our next result on allocation
inequality, we need to make further assumptions on F . We assume that f is
non increasing. Moreover we only consider one particular type of rst order
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stochastic dominance which comes from a shift in the support. For example,
consider the following family of exponential distribution,
fp(t) =

e (t a(p)) if t  a(p)
0 otherwise
where a(p) is a decreasing function of p. One can check that if p1 > p2 then
Fp1 (t)  Fp2 (t) for all t. p1 > p2 also implies a(p1) < a(p2) and hence for all
t, fp1(t)  fp2(t). Therefore, for all xi
Fp1

xi
1 2xi

fp1

xi
1 2xi
  Fp2

xi
1 2xi

fp2

xi
1 2xi
 (6)
Note that the left-hand side of Equation 5 is an increasing function of xi
and starts above the right hand side (at xi = 0). Let xi(p) be the equilibrium
share of the pie that j o¤ers to i, where
xi(p) = fminxijxi satises Equation 5}
Thus for all xi < xi(p1), we have
(1 xi)
(1 2xi)2 >
Fp1

xi
1 2xi

fp1

xi
1 2xi
 . By Equation 6,
(1 xi)
(1 2xi)2 >
Fp2

xi
1 2xi

fp2

xi
1 2xi
 for all xi < xi(p1). Therefore xi(p2)  xi(p1). That is
inequality of allocation increases with a decrease in inequality of opportunity.
From the data we observe a jump from p = 0 to p = 0:01, which can be
obtained on our post-hoc model if we assume that there is a jump from F0
to Fp for any p > 0. But how can we explain this jump?
6.2 Symbolic value of Opportunities?
This is where, we believe Nozicks symbolic utility comes in. Even a minimal
opportunity can make agents signicantly less envious20. Following Nozick
(1993, pp 27.28): Having a symbolic meaning, the actions are treated as
having the utility of what they symbolically mean [...] Since symbolic actions
often are expressive actions, another view of them would be this: the symbolic
connection of an action to a situation enables the action to be expressive of
some attitude, belief, value, emotions or whatever. Expressiveness not utility
is what ows back.
Accordingly, our conjecture is that the act of making a proposal may
symbolize, for the unfavoured player, opportunities independently on the
20To use a popular phrase people blame misfortune for their situation rather than the
system.
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expected utility coming from having this option. The di¤erence between F0
and F0:1 is the fact that in the last case an action symbolizing the opportunity
of being a proposer has been taken. This may then explain the discontinuity
between F0 and F0:1:
This seems consistent with what Nozick writes later (p. 34): Sometimes,
though, the presence of probabilities rather than certainty may remove a
symbolic meaning altogether. It is not the case that half or one-tenth chance
of realizing a certain goal always itself has half or one tenth the symbolic
utility of that goal itselfit need not symbolize that goal, even partially.
The above model and our interpretation of the di¤erence between p = 0
and p = 0:01 as symbolic are consistent with our main results. However, as
we already mentioned in this section we put forward our theoretical sketch
as a possible justication rather than a full-blown explanation.
7 Summary
We studied the impact on wealth distribution of varying the degree of oppor-
tunity that a player has of becoming the proposer in an UG. We compared
the outcomes of four di¤erent settings according to the degree of opportuni-
ties. Our results clearly indicate that allowing players positive opportunities
of being selected as proposers radically change the payo¤ distribution and
the conictuality rates. In particular, o¤ers are on average lower and the
probability of acceptances higher when the rules have positive opportunities
for both players compared to when they are absent for one player. This re-
lationship is monotonic in the level of opportunity, but highly concave: the
di¤erences both in terms of proposals and acceptance rates are strongly signif-
icant comparing the 1% opportunity to the no opportunity setting; whereas
no signicant di¤erences emerge between the 1% opportunity setting and the
other positive opportunity settings. The e¤ect of intertemporal allocation of
opportunity seems instead to lead to a strong monotonic pattern between
the condition with intertemporal inequality of opportunities (FRC) and in-
tertemporal equality (VRC). This supports our initial assumption that also
intertemporal opportunity have an e¤ect on wealth allocation as well. There-
fore, subjects in our experiment appears to be motivated mostly by a purely
symbolic opportunity rather than by the actual fairness in the allocation
of opportunities. This lend some support to Nozicks idea that individuals
attach symbolic values to action.
28
8 Appendix
Table 14: Econometric Analysis of Proposals
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PROPOSAL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rounds ALL 1 20 ALL
Random E¤ect Yes No No Yes
1%-Opp FRC Dummy 0.491*** 0.367 0.580***
(0.17) (0.27) (0.22)
20%-Opp FRC Dummy 0.614*** 0.445 0.740***
(0.17) (0.27) (0.20)
Eq. Opp Dummy 0.684*** 0.611** 0.724***
(0.16) (0.26) (0.19)
0%-Opp VRC Dummy 0.269* -0.120 0.515***
(0.16) (0.33) (0.18)
1%-Opp VRC Dummy 0.907*** 0.765*** 1.189***
(0.16) (0.29) (0.21)
20%-Opp VRC Dummy 1.097*** 0.554* 1.435***
(0.16) (0.29) (0.19)
FRC Dummy -0.164
(0.13)
TREND 0.0315***
(0.0050)
FRC  TREND -0.0210***
(0.0059)
Constant 6.028*** 6.219*** 6.260*** 6.627***
(0.14) (0.21) (0.15) (0.10)
ROUD DUMMIES YES - - YES
Observations 4880 244 244 3640
cross section units 332 - - 270
R2 (adjusted) 0.0402 0.174
R2 (overall model) 0.108 0.0516
R2 (between model) 0.164 0.0478
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 15: Econometric Analysis of Acceptance Rates
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ACCEPTANCE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROUNDS ALL 1 20 ALL
Random E¤ects Yes No No Yes
OFFER 2.906*** 1.523*** 1.364*** 2.774***
(0.12) (0.27) (0.34) (0.13)
1%-Opp FRC Dummy 1.748*** 0.366 1.145
(0.67) (0.86) (0.79)
20%-Opp FRC Dummy 2.592*** 1.026 1.591**
(0.68) (1.06) (0.81)
Eq :Opp FRC Dummy 3.292*** 1.530 1.547*
(0.64) (1.04) (0.83)
0%-Opp VRC Dummy 2.285*** -0.596 2.685**
(0.66) (0.87) (1.19)
1%-Opp VRC Dummy 3.493*** 1.568* 2.415**
(0.66) (0.92) (1.13)
20%-Opp VRC Dummy 4.733*** 0.760 2.179***
(0.69) (0.87) (0.84)
TREND 0.0842***
(0.030)
FRC Dummy -1.682***
(0.44)
FRC  TREND -0.0348
(0.026)
Constant -7.999*** -3.589*** -3.405*** -4.599***
(0.72) (1.17) (1.31) (0.55)
ROUND DUMMIES YES - - YES
Observations 3977 197 198 3357
cross section units 332 - - 270
chi2 579.8 35.77 17.37 505.1
p-value 0 0 0 0
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: Di¤erences in Proposals - FRC - Round 1
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 1:34
20%-Opp 1:63 0:32
Eq-Opp 2:35   1:08 0:74
Table 17: Di¤erences in Proposals - VRC - Round 1
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 2:76
20%-Opp 2:12  0:75
Eq-Opp 2:53  0:62 0:23
Table 18: Di¤erences in Acceptance - FRC - Round 1
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 0.43
20%-Opp 0.97 0.74
Eq-Opp 1.47 1.37 0.52
Table 19: Di¤erences in Acceptance - VRC - Round 1
0%-Opp 1%-Opp 20%-Opp
0%-Opp
1%-Opp 2:73  
20%-Opp 1:83 0:246
Eq-Opp 2:27    0:05 0:94
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9 Instructions for 1%-Opp FRC
Welcome to this research project. A team of researchers is looking at the way
in which people make decisions. If you pay close attention to the instructions
then you could make a signicant amount of money. If you wish, you can
follow the instructions on the screen in front of you.
The research team that is here today includes myself, Gianluca Grimalda,
and my assistants.
Before starting with the explanation of the decisions you are going to
make, please pay attention to some important information and recommen-
dations.
In this project you are going to be asked to make decisions with other
people who are currently in this room. Your choices, and the choices of others,
will be matched with the help of a computer programme as we proceed. It
is important for you to note that all interactions are entirely anonymous.
Firstly, we will not know anything about your choices and your payment.
We will just record your choices through the ID number that you have just
drawn, and the payments will be made using that number as identication. It
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is therefore important that you do not lose the card you have drawn, because
that is the only document that enables you to be paid. You may collect your
payments at the end of this session. You will be required to sign a receipt, but
there is no need for you to print your name. University administration does
require that you write in your student number when signing this receipt.
However, your student number will be held condentially by our research
group, and we will not make any attempt to link your student number to the
decisions you have made.
At the end of your decisions, while we prepare your payments, we would
ask that you complete a short questionnaire. You are required to state your
Student ID number. Even in this case, your responses to this questionnaire
will be held under condentiality rules by our research group.
Secondly, the decisions you are going to make involve interacting with
other people who are present in this room. However, you will not have to talk
or communicate directly in any way with anybody in this room. Instead, your
decisions will be processed through a computer programme that networks all
of the computers in this room. In this way, nobody will be able to identify
with whom s/he is actually making decisions. The interaction will proceed
as follows: You will receive some messages on the screen in front of you.
This will either include some information on the state of the decisions, or
prompt you to make certain choices. Once you are sure about your choice,
you have to press the button OK, which will take you to the next stages of
the decisions. At times, you will be asked to wait for further instructions,
because it may take a bit of time before the programme processes all your
decisions.
If you are not clear on this or on other issues, please raise your hand.
You will be involved in 20 di¤erent interactions with other people in this
room. In each interaction, you will be paired with another person, and the
two of you will be making a decision together. Our programme will draw
at random the pairs at the beginning of each interaction. This means that
with very high probability you will be paired with a di¤erent partner at each
interaction.
As you will see, the decisions involve money. In each decision there will
be £ 10 at stake. Unfortunately, we will not be able to pay you for each
decision you make, but only for TWO interactions out of the 20. These will
be drawn at random at the end of this session, and everyone will be paid
according to the outcome of those 2 rounds. In this way, you are required to
pay maximum attention to each decision you are going to make, because only
at the end of the session we will learn which ones determine your payments.
Some nal recommendations: You are asked to be quiet throughout the
session. You must not talk with anybody else, or look at otherscomputer
screens. Anyone infringing these simple rules will be asked to leave the room.
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You can now press the OK button and go to the next screen.
We are now going to look at the simple rules that will govern each of the
interactions:
 An amount worth £ 10 is to be divided between you and the person
you have been paired with.
 Both of you are asked to make a proposal. Your proposal is any
amount X less than or equal to £ 10 that you want to keep for yourself. You
may use any number up to the second decimal digit. The residual amount
(10-X) is to be assigned to the other person you have been paired with.
 Once you and the other person in your group have submitted your
proposals, one of them is drawn at random. The random selection works as
follows. Half of the people in this room are favored with respect to the others
in having their proposals selected. In particular, half of the people have a
99% probability that their proposals will be selected within their groups,
whereas the others have a 1% probability.
 You will be informed about which probability your proposal has of
being selected in the rst round, and this probability will remain the same
throughout all the remaining rounds. Each group will be made up of a person
with a 99% probability and another person with a 1% probability of their
proposals being selected.
 The person whose proposal has been selected (the proposer) is
asked to wait for the decision of the other person in the group. The person
whose proposal has not been selected (the receiver), is informed of the share
allocated to him/her by the proposal of the other person. She is then asked
to either ACCEPT or REJECT this proposal.
 If the receiver accepts this proposal, then everyone gets the share
determined by this proposal. If the receiver rejects this proposal, then both
people in the group get £ 0 each.
 At the end of each interaction, a new random draw will take place to
determine your next partner. This will be a person from the half of the people
in this room with a probability di¤erent from yours of their proposals being
selected. It is therefore very unlikely you will be paired with the same person
again. Moreover, all decisions are independent. What you do in a round does
not inuence the next rounds and is not inuenced by the previous rounds.
For instance, if you reject a proposal in one interaction, it doesnt mean
that you also reject those that came before, of those that will come after-
wards.
Lets see an example together. Please write in the answers if you wish.
a) In the rst round Person A is informed that she has 99% probability of
having her proposal selected, and Person B is informed that his proposal has
1% probability of being selected. Person A makes the proposal to keep £ 6.50
for herself. Person B makes the proposal to keep £ 8.55 for himself. Person
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As proposal is selected, and person B the receiver - accepts. What is
their nal allocation?
- Person A . . . . . . . . . 6.50. . . . . . . . . .
- Person B . . . . . . . . . 3.50. . . . . . . . . .
b) In the second round Persons A and C are reminded that the probability
of having their proposals selected are 99% and 1%, respectively. Person A
makes the proposal to keep £ 2.50 for herself. Person C makes the proposal
to keep £ 5.50 for himself. Person Cs proposal is selected, and Person A 
the receiver- rejects the proposal. What is their nal allocation?
- Person A . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. . . . . . .
- Person C . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. . . . . . .
We now want to make sure that you have understood the rules of the
interaction correctly. Please turn the page and ll out the answers to the
examples. When you have nished raise your hand. One assistant will come
and check that your answers are correct, and will collect the sheet.
Proposal 2: x2
Player 1
A R
10-x2
x2
0
0
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Nature
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Proposal 1: x1
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0
0
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Proposal 2: x2Proposal 1: x1
Figure 1
Figure 1: The stage game
36
55.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Period
Me
an
 pr
op
os
al
Fixed 0-Opp Fixed 1%-Opp Fixed 20%-Opp EQ Opp
Figure 2: Evolution of Proposals
0
50
100
150
200
250
Variable 0-Opp Variable 1%-Opp Variable 20%-Opp EQ Opp Fixed 0-Opp Fixed 1%-Opp Fixed 20%-Opp
Low offers rejected Low offers accepted
Figure 3: Low o¤ers
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Figure 4: Proposal VRC
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